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Preface 
 
 
 
Due to changing trade policies, technological change and other factors, the structure of the 
agricultural sector is developing rapidly. Many farmers are challenged by these develop-
ments. 
 To study such phenomena the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium 
(IATRC) organised a symposium on June 6 and 7 2004 in Philadelphia, USA, titled 'Ad-
justing to Domestic and International Policy Reform in Industrial Countries'. The 
organisers, Professor David Blandford (Penn State University, USA) and Professor Berke-
ley Hill (Imperial College at Wye, UK), invited Krijn Poppe and Hans van Meijl to 
contribute a paper with a farm management perspective. 
 As this paper provides an interesting overview of 30 years of research on this topic 
within LEI, we have decided to make it more widely available. We think the insights gath-
ered over the last decennia can be useful for researchers and policy-makers in the current 
process of structural adjustment (also labelled 'transition' in the Netherlands). 
 The contribution to the symposium and the publication of this paper was supported 
by a project commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Humans differ in their capabilities, also in their professional work. A few actors win an 
Oscar, others struggle to get staged for a B-movie. A few researchers become a Nobel lau-
reate, many more face difficulties to get their papers in a B-journal. As there are good and 
bad actors, good and bad researchers, it is extremely likely that out in the fields there are 
good and mediocre farmers. For those who doubt, figure 1.1 gives the distribution of fam-
ily farm income of dairy farms for different European regions. 
 This fact of differences in performance raises a lot of policy-relevant questions: what 
are the determinants of these differences, can these determinants be influenced by policy, 
to whom should support be targeted: frontrunners or laggards, can farmers be better trained 
to move the average capabilities upward, how many incentives should be built in the policy 
to let good farmers win the competition from the mediocre ones, etc. Such questions be-
come even more important in the light of policy adjustments. 
 
 
-40000
-20000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
G
erm
any
France
Italy
B
elgium
Luxem
burg
N
etherlands
D
enm
ark
Ireland
U
K
G
reece
Spain
Portugal
A
ustria
Finland
Sw
eden
 
Figure 1.1 Distribution of family farm income (in euros) of specialised dairy farms, 1999 
Source: FADN-CCE-DG Agri; adaptation LEI (Vrolijk et al., 2004). 
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 In the preparation of this workshop the organisers Hill and Blandford noticed that in 
recent years the agricultural economic journals have not published many papers on the 
topic of differences in farm performance. Our impression from the Netherlands is that this 
is indeed true and due to the fact that the topic went a bit out of fashion and shows not 
much innovation in methodology (the Data Envelop Analysis method perhaps being an ex-
ception). But some of this type of research was undertaken in applied research, be it 
sometimes with another goal (like environmental issues or the role of information technol-
ogy). 
 With the organisers we agree that the theme is for the future with major policy re-
forms on its way and ahead, becoming more important again. From a scientific point of 
view as the changes in policy and organisational structure of the food system provide am-
ple empirical data to test theories, in which nowadays e.g. also risk attitudes and 
management are integrated. And from a policy point of view to understand the role of farm 
management in the developing of the farm sector in West as well as Eastern Europe. 
 In this paper we try to review the developments on this topic in the last 30 years. We 
have been asked to do this from a European perspective, but in writing the paper we de-
cided first to concentrate on the Dutch developments. We know these best and are able to 
add undocumented developments in research as the authors worked for most of this period 
on the theme.1 In addition to this Dutch case we added some relevant European literature 
that we are aware of. 
 The paper is structured as follows: after a brief introduction to the strategic manage-
ment literature the next four sections follow a historical path. We then turn to innovation 
theory and economic theory in general to interpret findings from the earlier decades. We 
then move to the policy relevance of this material and end up with conclusions and rec-
ommendation for further research. 
                                                 
1 The best documentation can be found in the jubilee publication of the LEI commemorating its 50th anniver-
sary, see Bauwens et al. (1990). 
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2. Strategic management literature: A brief description 
 
 
 
The strategic management literature studies the creation of a competitive advantage and 
provides a background why farms differ in strategy and performance. In this brief descrip-
tion we focus on the influential theory of Porter and on the resource-based theory of 
competitive advantage. 
 
Porter's theory 
Sustainable competitive advantage is the fundamental basis of above-average performance 
in the long run in Porter's (1980,1985) theory. There are two basic types of competitive ad-
vantage a firm can possess: low costs or differentiation.1 The ability of firms to earn above-
normal profits is dependent on the attractiveness of an industry which is subject to the rules 
of competition. These are embodied in five competitive forces: the entry of new competi-
tors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of 
suppliers and the rivalry of existing competitors. 
 To analyse the sources of competitive advantage, Porter (1985, ch.2) introduces the 
value chain, which desegregates a firm into its strategically relevant activities to under-
stand the behaviour of costs and the existing and potential sources of differentiation. Every 
value activity employs purchased inputs, human resources (labour and management) and 
some form of technology to perform its function. The value chain of a firm is embedded in 
a larger stream of activities that Porter calls the value system. Value is created by the value 
chain of suppliers, the value chain of channels and eventually a firm's product becomes 
part of the buyer's value chain. Porter stresses that these vertical linkages are frequently 
overlooked and that gaining and sustaining competitive advantage depends on understand-
ing not only a firm's value chain but how the firm fits in the overall value system. The 
competitiveness of a firm or chain can be improved by coordination and cooperation be-
tween chain members. Both product (logistics) and information flows are crucial. 
 
The Resource-based theory of Competitive Advantage 
 
'A firm's competitive position is defined by a bundle of unique resources and rela-
tionships and that the task of general management is to adjust and renew these 
resources and relationships as time, competition, and change erode their value'. (Ru-
melt, 1984, pp. 557-558) 
                                                 
1 These two basic types of competitive advantage combined with the scope of activities lead to three generic 
strategies for achieving above-normal performance in an industry: cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. 
The focus strategy has two variants, cost focus and differentiation focus. The cost leadership and differentia-
tion strategies seek competitive advantage in a broad range of industry segments, while focus strategies aim 
at cost or differentiation advantage in a narrow segment. 
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 The central point of the resource-based theory is that firms' ultimate objective is to 
obtain above-normal returns. These can be achieved for a long time if tangible and intangi-
ble resources of an organisation are combined in a strategic manner such that the firms 
product is distinctive in the eyes of buyers (e.g. the firm's product must offer to consumers 
a dissimilar and attractive attribute/price relationship, in comparison to substitutes), or that 
a firm selling an identical product in comparison to competitors must have a low cost posi-
tion (Conner, 1991). 
 Barney (1991) shows that there are four characteristics of resources that lead to sus-
tainability above normal profits: 
- the resources must be valuable; that is, they make a positive contribution to exploit-
ing a position in the market; 
- the resources must be rare; they cannot be widely available to competitors; 
- the resources must be not perfectly imitable by competitors1; 
- and there cannot be substitutes easily available for the resource. 
 
 The resources cover physical, financial and human capital on the one hand and or-
ganisational capital on the other (Tomer, 1987). The latter includes knowledge, 
information, intangible assets (such as brand names and market position), decision making 
processes and coordination systems. The latter are especially difficult to imitate and can 
create a sustainable competitive advantage. 
                                                 
1 A resource cannot be easily replicated if it arises from the idiosyncratic history of the firm (path depend-
ence), socially complex phenomena within or between organisations, or causal ambiguity in the strategy 
process (i.e. cause-effect relationships between resources and sustained performance are poorly understood 
and therefore difficult to imitate). 
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3. Differences in farm profit 
 
 
 
For the Netherlands a review of the literature should start with the seminal PhD thesis of 
Vinus Zachariasse (1974), the current director of the Social Sciences Group of Wagenin-
gen UR (including LEI). 
 Economists doing empirical work on differences in farm performance seldom have a 
good control of their data: in micro-economic data sets farms also differ in farm size, loca-
tion etc. Zachariasse had the possibility to overcome this problem not by statistical 
methods but by making use of the data of farmers in the area were he grew up: the Noord-
oostpolder, an area reclaimed from the sea in 1942, were the 29 arable farms studied in his 
sample all started their farm in the same year, on the same type of soil, with the same farm 
size (about 33 ha) and farm buildings, and the land all in the same rectangular shape. The 
farmers had to pass a selection process when the farms where handed out to them (most 
came from regions with land-re-allotment schemes elsewhere) which perhaps resulted in 
not having the worst farmers in the area, and hence in the sample. That made the findings 
even more striking. The difference in income between the best and the worst were roughly 
the level of a minister's salary: roughly € 25,000 in current currency but at 1968 price lev-
els and double that amount in 1969. 
 Zachariasse gathered a lot of economic and technical data on the farms, and using 
factor analysis he showed that aspects in day-to-day management, and hence the farmer 
himself, were the determining factor in the differences in income. Most of the farmers had 
difficulty in balancing work organisation on the farm and especially also in long-term 
(strategic) decisions. A great part of the differences in physical yields per ha could be ex-
plained by differences in the farmer's technical competences. A survey on the farmer's 
learning process showed that his capacity to think about the growth process of plants is es-
sential for his competence. The analysis indicated that the farmer's willingness to criticise 
his own decisions and actions and to continue learning are fundamental in keeping the en-
terprise profitable. 
 Even the farming community was surprised to learn that differences were that high. 
From an information perspective it suggests that farmers often compared (sometimes 
biased) technical results, but did not benchmark their more privacy-sensitive economic 
data. So they were not aware of their relative economic performance. One of the more 
practical results of the study was a boost in more detailed farm accounting (introduced with 
EU subsidies a few years earlier) and benchmarking study groups. 
 The work by Zachariasse was followed up by a large number of studies for several 
farm types and crops. They were often carried out by economists of LEI (from Zachari-
asse's department) and more technically-oriented researchers at experimental stations. They 
involved very detailed data gathering (also on soil quality, soil preparations etc.), which 
was then analysed by factor- and regression analysis. A typical study was one on ware po-
tatoes in an area south of Rotterdam. The main conclusion was that there were big 
differences in yields and income per ha, and that the quality of management decisions in 
 13
spring time were decisive: mistakes in soil preparation during planting have big effects in 
the growing season and are hard to repair with a bit more fertilizer. 
 The focus of these studies on operational management can be explained in hindsight: 
marketing and strategic management were not so important then, and the results of such 
studies were very usable by the state advisory system to provide general (i.e. not very 
farm-specific) advice. 
 After a decade this type of research went out of fashion. Researchers moved on to 
environmental issues (which we will review in the next section), the introduction of ICT 
and to the management of the farm at tactical level. The latter was based on a publication 
by Wim de Hoop et al. (1988) who had interviewed dairy farmers. That indicated that dairy 
farmers spend much attention on tactical management, i.e. the way in which several as-
pects of the farm will be developed in the coming period. This includes what-if analysis, 
not carried out formally on paper, but by own reasoning. With the growing farm size, or-
ganisational issues probably became more important. 
 Before we move on, a number of additional marks have to be made on the results of 
the research on differences in economic performance, also in more recent years. First, it is 
important to realise that due to weather influences and Cobb-Web cycles results in agricul-
ture differ from year to year. Farmers know this and have a number of techniques (from 
saving and timing of investments to hedging) to cope with this. This is not always perfectly 
reflected in accounting and yearly indicators, and yearly fluctuations in income are a real-
ity. That means that distribution data can be calculated better by averaging the incomes of 
holdings over a three-year period than using yearly data. 
 Second, it has been noted that in the Netherlands the distribution of total family in-
come (that is farm income and non-agricultural income) had become more skewed in the 
1990s. This has even led to questions in parliament and a study by Alleblas et al. (1998). 
Part of the explanation was sought in differences in farm styles and differences in objec-
tives and strategies of the farm family (see also below). Increasing technological change 
can also contribute (and in various ways1) to increasing income differences. 
 In recent years a number of studies at the European level have been carried out to 
analyse differences in cost prices of production between regions. These studies investigate 
the competitive position of the regions. It has been shown that in a number of cases the dif-
ferences between farms within European regions are bigger than those between regions. 
                                                 
1 The first way is that some innovators find a more rewarding business model than farmers that lag behind. In 
addition some of the innovators can show low results as their new business model is not as successful as they 
anticipated. And some of them invest heavily, accepting low margins, to increase their holding to reap the 
profits later. Conservative accounting can then understate future income. 
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4. Differences in environmental performance 
 
 
 
It is not just in income or profitability that farmers show differences in performance. The 
same is true for their environmental performance. Since the mid-1980s a lot of research has 
been carried out on the environmental problems in Dutch agriculture relate to energy 
(glasshouse horticulture), mineral nutrients (including the manure issue), pesticides and 
even water. 
 For each indicator of environmental performance the value for the 20% best perform-
ing farmers is way ahead of the lowest 20%. This can perhaps be expected as long as there 
is no (policy) incentive to manage this environmental performance, but in the Netherlands 
these differences still exist despite many years of targeted policies. 
 The fact that there are such differences and the experiences with benchmarking and 
study groups even played a large role in designing the Dutch mineral policy by introducing 
mineral accounts. The idea was that a farm accounting system could easily also generate a 
mineral account that could be used in farm management, benchmarking and could be taxed 
like income (Breembroek et al., 1996). The system not only focuses on manure production 
(or number of animals) per ha, but also on fertilizer. Although methodologically superior 
and rather successful (Hubeek et al., 2004), the system now has run into trouble as its re-
sults are not in line with the EU Nitrate Directive. 
 The AAEA Award-winning PhD thesis by Stijn Reinhard (1999a, see also 1999b) is 
probably the best English-language starting point for researchers who are interested in the 
differences in environmental efficiency. Reinhard used the stochastic frontier approach and 
Data Envelop Analysis to analyse the efficiency of Dutch dairy farms. His main innovation 
was to show how environmental aspects could be modelled into the neo-classical produc-
tion function by defining it as a bad output. The empirical part of the study shows that 
environmental efficiency differs between dairy farms and can be improved by encouraging 
a higher milk yield and by providing the farmer with more insight into the nutrient balance 
of his farm. 
 At Wageningen University a number of comparable studies have been carried out, 
using FADN data and advanced econometrics to create profit function and household pro-
duction models (see for an overview in English: Peerlings and Oude Lansink, 2000). 
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5. Different management levels 
 
 
 
The innovative Dutch horticultural sector, with fast growing holdings to reap the benefits 
of efficiencies of scale in a growing market, provided a fruitful environment for several 
studies on management. 
 During the period 1979-1987, LEI researcher Joop Alleblas carried out a number of 
studies that contributed to his PhD Thesis (Alleblas, 1988). The objective was to measure 
the actual level of management in glasshouse horticulture, to analyse its relationship with 
the economic performance of the firm and to assess the appropriate level of management 
given the entrepreneur's objectives and the firm characteristics (and hence to comment on 
the discrepancy between actual and appropriate level). 
 Management was made measurable by making a model in which decision making ac-
tivities and characteristics were identified in six fields: strategic decisions, cropping plan 
decisions, task-scheduling decisions, training and educational level, modernity and techni-
cal level (up to date or not?) of the business, and other, mainly social factors. Measuring 
the actual level of management showed that this was rather low (40% of the theoretical 
maximum level) and could be improved considerably. The analysis or factor analysis car-
ried out, showed that 50% of the differences in yield level and economic results could be 
attributed to differences in management. However, the appropriate (or 'fitting') level of 
management is not necessarily the maximum level. It depends on the entrepreneur's objec-
tives and structural characteristics of the firm. It was shown that the appropriate level is in 
general higher for larger firms and for firms where employees (in addition to family la-
bour) are involved. Expanding firms have a higher level of management than stable ones. 
The study made recommendations on how management consultancy could be based on 
measuring and closing the gap between the actual and appropriate management level com-
ponents. 
 In recent years Nicole Taragola has expanded this type of research in Belgian glass-
house horticulture by including research on the relationship between managerial and firm 
characteristics with information use (Taragola, 2002) and on adoption of innovative prac-
tices (Taragola, 2001). These studies reveal that the general theoretical framework for 
explaining the adoption of pro-active or 'innovative' strategies is also useful for the case of 
adoption of environmentally sound and high quality production strategies in Belgian glass-
house horticulture. Personal characteristics of the firm manager, such as expressive 
objectives ('ambition', 'self development' etc.), have a positive impact on tactical environ-
mental management decisions. Growth-oriented and larger firms are more likely to invest 
in such strategies. 
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6. Differences in farm strategies 
 
 
 
In the 1990s differences in farm strategy became a research topic. The background were 
developments in the strategic management literature as described in section 2 and that 
some farm sectors faced big adjustments. With saturated markets and more competition 
(e.g. tomatoes from Spain, pigs and poultry from several regions, following the lowering of 
cereal prices and higher environmental costs), many Dutch farms faced strategic decisions. 
There were also new opportunities in so-called multi-functional agriculture which had to 
be evaluated by farmers vis-a-vis scaling up the farm by e.g. buying quota. 
 This type of research was also carried out - under another research agenda - by eco-
nomic sociologists like Jan-Douwe van der Ploeg at Wageningen University (see for 
instance Ploeg, 1996). In this type of research farmers were classified into different 'farm 
styles': different methods to run the same type of farm that received descriptive labels like 
'machinery dairy farmers', 'herdsmen', 'cattle breeders'. Classification was partly based on 
farm structure and economic indicators, and partly reflected normative notions in peer 
groups on 'how to farm'. The policy relevance was that certain CAP policies fitted one type 
of farmers more than others with the risk of some types becoming extinct and a loss of di-
versity. But it also showed that new rural development policies could fit some types of 
farming very well. 
 Economists working in farm management at first rejected some of these studies. Be-
sides the not-invented-here effect, this was due to the fact that differences in farm styles 
were interpreted in economic theory more as consumption than as investment behaviour. If 
income on some farms was high enough to spend lavishly on machinery, then that was 
more seen as a result of an imperfect market or room for spending, than as a farm strategy. 
 Once farm management researchers started to do their own research into strategic 
management of farms and farm households, they began to stress that farmers have different 
objectives and competences, and that their strategy is and should be based on this. Two ex-
amples illustrate this type of research: 
- Van den Ham and Ypma (2000) investigated attitudes and behaviour of farmers that 
successfully developed their farm into multi-functional agriculture. Based on 18 in 
depth interviews they classified them into two groups: Inspired Multi-functionalists 
and Rational Multi-functionalists. The inspired ones have a clear mission that is dif-
ferent from the dominant one in the sector. Based on that mission they have clear 
objectives and a detailed strategy. Their 'corporate social responsibility' objectives 
are at least as important as their economic ones. With vision and creativity they try to 
overcome challenges and in this they use a broad array of social and communicative 
competences, building bridges to the non-farming and even non-rural community. 
Rational Multi-functionalists, however, decide on rational (economic) grounds for 
multi-functional activities (including organic farming). They are much more focus-
sed on government policy, which they see as a reflection of societal trends. These 
farmers have more problems with inconsistent signals, as their choice for multi-
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functional activities is less intimate. However, this group is probably five times as 
large as the Inspired Multi-functionalists. 
- The second example of 'different concepts of farming for different competences' is 
also by Van den Ham (2003). To analyse differences in production costs of milk (and 
hence profitability of dairy farmers) in this study dairy farms where classified ac-
cording to their objective in business development and farm strategies. The objective 
in business development ranges from the Inspired Multi-functionalists to Growth-for-
scale farmers, with the Rational multi-functionalists as one of the groups in between. 
These groups were split up with more detailed farm strategies. Figure 6.1 and box 6.1 
provide some of the results. The study concluded that farm sector adjustment proc-
esses ask for strategic entrepreneurship of the farmer, in which own competences, 
external analysis and strong and weak points of the farm are central. 
 
 Researchers in farm management have developed tools to support farmers and their 
advisors in this strategic management. These tools are also used in policy research. Poli-
cymakers commission such studies to see the effects of their policy proposals when 
innovation is treated as endogenous, and to show such results to the farming community. 
These tools for strategic management have been developed at LEI into a methodology la-
belled 'Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP)'. It is a method in which well-known tools from 
strategic planning (such as a SWOT matrix) are used to support farmers in their strategic 
decision making. ISP is based on the farm management cycle (figure 6.2). Information 
products that farmers could use in these stages are a strategic management report (fig-
ure 6.3) and a benchmark report (figure 6.4). ISP can be used by consultants (agricultural 
advisors and accountants) to provide specific individual farm support. However, the farm 
manager himself is the problem holder and should stay central in the process of strategic 
decision making. 
 
Full cost price farmers do not so much stress certain aspects of the farm but are keen to reduce costs. Growth 
minded farmers try to increase the economies of scale of the farm and prefer own machinery over contrac-
tors. Environmental farmers focus on very low mineral surpluses. Grassland managers look for high yields 
of grass and labour saving: cows are only part time outside to combine high nitrate use with good environ-
mental practice. Economical farmers are economical and strongly risk-averse. Practical farmers focus on 
labour saving and choose to outsource activities to contractors. Machine managers do not use contractors, 
probably due to less optimal location of land parcels. Cow farmers try to optimise the results per cow, seeing 
the animal as the main asset. 
 
Box 6.1 Types of dairy farmers (see figure 6.1 for their results) 
 
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the importance of different strategies for various agricultural sectors. 
The cost reduction strategy is seen as most important in all sectors. This is in line with the 
common perception that agricultural sectors produce homogenous commodities and the 
only way to obtain a competitive advantage is reducing costs. In dairy and the intensive 
livestock sectors the cost reduction strategy is still the dominant strategy. Often it is com-
bined with a growth strategy directed at obtaining economies of scale. However, if we 
focus on the greenhouse horticulture and fruit sectors, a product differentiation strategy 
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Figure 6.1 Cost prices per kg of milk and farm size in ha for different groups of dairy farms in the Nether-
lands, 1999/00 
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Figure 6.3 An example (summary) of a strategic management report 
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Figure 6.4 An example of a benchmark report (in Dutch): on top, explanation; left-hand side, key indica-
tors; bars with comparison) 
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Figure 6.5 Percentage of respondents that consider a certain strategy important for their holding, by sec-
tor 
Source: Galen en Bunte (2003). 
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and improving chain relations are almost as important as cost reduction. Since the nineties 
the horticulture sectors in the Netherlands have been changing rapidly from a cost reduc-
tion focus to an increasingly market oriented focus. The consumer is the focus of attention 
and the whole chain works together to fulfil consumers' needs. More and more, different 
strategies can be observed together: some horticulture farms choose a cost reduction strat-
egy, others a product differentiation strategy. 
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7. Different innovation strategies 
 
 
 
A related topic to differences in farm performance, farm strategies and differences in man-
agement levels, is the research on innovation. Since the last part of the 1990s, LEI tries to 
evaluate the innovation policy of the Dutch government (which is in line with the EU's so-
called Lisbon process to create a more dynamic and innovative economy based on knowl-
edge). The evaluation is based on questionnaires and micro-economic data from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network. 
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Figure 7.1 Percentage of respondents that consider a certain technology strategy important by sector 
Source: Galen en Bunte (2003). 
 
 
 Innovation is important to obtain a competitive advantage and earn above-average 
profits. Figure 7.1 shows that own research activities and leading in technology are consid-
ered more important in the greenhouse horticulture sectors. Own research in these sectors 
is partly directed to creating new varieties (e.g. flowers). In the other sectors own research 
efforts are still limited. This may be due to the small size of farms and the difficulty to ap-
propriate benefits due to the large number of farms and the difficulty to differentiate their 
products. Because of their small scale of operations, farms have limited opportunities to 
develop and implement innovations in a profitable way, limited financial resources and in-
house specialised expertise, and limited management resources. Because farms are rather 
small, adoption of technologies developed elsewhere and cooperative research are 
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relatively important strategies. A recent report (Van Galen and Bunte, 2003) has a number 
of relevant conclusions about the differences in strategies and performance of farms: 
- the innovative capacity of Dutch agriculture is limited: 3% of the holdings in the 
sample realised an innovation in 1999. This means that in the Netherlands 3,100 ag-
ricultural holdings started to use a means of production (input or machine) or started 
to market a product that was new for the Dutch agricultural sector. However, a third 
of the farms realised something new (by copying) on their own holding. Ten percent 
had R&D expenses. Glasshouse horticulture is much more innovative than arable and 
livestock farming; 
- investments in agriculture have an incremental character. Risks are limited and ef-
fects on profit and market share are also rather small. Innovators handle more radical 
innovations and see a larger effect on profits and market share; 
- a quarter of the farms invested in new production techniques, where less than 5% 
started to market a new product. This can be explained by the fact that managers re-
port fast-changing technologies, severe competition but limited changes in demand. 
Changing the agricultural chains into demand-driven supply chains has until now 
only limited impacts on farm level innovation. Societal demands also contribute to 
innovations, but is also seen as a bottleneck in innovations, especially in pig- and 
poultry farming; 
- new production and organisation methods have been adopted. Diffusion follows the 
well-known S-shaped curve; 
- the most important bottlenecks for innovations are uncertainty on government poli-
cies, restrictive policies and high costs. The first is the most important for innovators, 
since they are able to find solutions for the other two. 
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 There is extensive empirical literature on the relationship between firm size (absolute 
or relative to the market) and innovation (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Brouwer and Kleink-
necht, 1996). A look at the raw data in figure 7.3, showing the distribution of innovative 
and non-innovative firms across a number of size categories, already suggests that there is 
a relationship between size and innovativeness: non-innovative firms are smaller on aver-
age. 
 Diederen, Meijl and Wolters (2002) found that innovative agricultural farms on aver-
age are larger than non-innovative firms, have more market power, engage in all sorts of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, are well informed, have younger management and supply un-
regulated markets. Furthermore, they are more profitable and grow faster. In a second 
paper, Diederen, Meijl and Wolters (2003a), analysed the choice of a farmer to be an inno-
vator, an early adopter or a laggard (an adopter of mature technologies or a non-adopter) in 
the adoption of innovations that are available on the market. They estimated a nested logit 
model with data for a large sample of Dutch farmers and found that structural characteris-
tics (farm size, market position, solvency, age of the farmer) explain the difference in 
adoption behaviour between innovators and early adopters on the one hand and 
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Figure 7.3 Size and innovativeness 
Source: Diederen, Meijl and Wolters (2002); Note: Size is measured in nge (Nederlandse grootte-eenheid), 
which stands for 'Dutch size unit', roughly comparable to the European Size Unit a). 
a) The number of nges is measured by multiplying the area or number of animals in each production unit 
with its standard gross margin (SGM) per unit, and that amount is divided by a specific factor (equal to 1,310 
in 1994) that leads to handy numbers and compensates for inflation. So a company that has 2 ha of tomatoes 
(SGM = € 202,000 per hectare) has [(202,000*2)/1310] = 308.40 nge. This method allows the aggregation of 
different products. 
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laggards on the other. Early adopters and innovators do not differ from each other regard-
ing these structural characteristics; they do however appear to differ in behavioural 
characteristics: innovators make more use of external sources of information and they are 
more involved in the actual development of innovations. 
 In a third paper, Diederen, Meijl and Wolters (2003b) used an ordered probit ap-
proach to relate adoption behaviour to variables that capture characteristics of the farm 
(labour and financial resources and market position), of the business environment of the 
farm (type of production and market, degree of regulation) and of the farmer (access to in-
formation, capabilities, preferences). They found that adoption behaviour shows some 
persistence in time: have been an innovator (or a late adopter) in the past increases the 
probability of being an innovator (a late adopter) in the current period. Finally, they found 
that characteristics of the business environment matter. What especially seems to have a 
negative impact on adoption behaviour, is a high degree of market regulation. The degree 
of market regulation was measured by including a dummy variable for farms producing in 
regulated sectors (e.g. dairy and arable farming). This approach does not prove the nega-
tive impact of regulation on innovation because other sector characteristics that are 
common between regulated sectors may cause this result. For example, products in regu-
lated sectors are more homogenous, which limits the possibility for innovation. 
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8. The findings from farm management studies in the light 
 of economic theory 
 
 
Those who have been trained in economics, and see the agricultural markets as a textbook 
example of perfect competition, are often amazed by the micro-economic statistics that 
show a large distribution of income, large differences in farm structures and high prices 
(relative to average incomes) for fixed factors such as land and quota. 
 Findings from farm management and innovation studies, as reported above, however, 
can easily be framed into normal economic theory. Agricultural markets, and especially 
those for bulk products such as milk, wheat or pork, are very competitive with limited pos-
sibilities for product differentiation. That requires farmers as price takers to focus on costs 
of production. However, farmers differ in their competences. They also inherit farms from 
the previous generation with different characteristics and in a different local external envi-
ronment. But even if (like in the studies of Zachariasse, 1974) this would be not the case, 
strategies and performance of farmers differ. 
 Different strategies can be an effective manner to adapt to the market, given own 
competences and local environmental conditions. But they can also lead to different per-
formance. In theory farmers should then learn from others and adopt a better strategy, or 
go out of business in a perfect market. But such learning is probably difficult. It is not al-
ways clear that better strategies are available, given one's own competences and the local 
external environment. Concerning self-criticism and learning, the small farmer, working 
more or less alone, is perhaps different from workers in larger organisations and networks 
where more feedback mechanisms exist. 
 In addition farmers can survive some time before the competitive market forces them 
out of business. They can adapt their consumption pattern, and their competences as self-
employed are not always in demand for other jobs in the rural area. So opportunity costs of 
labour can be low, and especially for older farmers it can be economically sound to stay in 
business with a very low level of (replacement) investments to sustain their cash flow. 
 Farmers with the best skills and strategy are able to have a high profit margin and in-
come. They are interested in increasing production and realising economies of scale of new 
production technologies. Then they often need extra assets that have a fixed supply such as 
land and quota. For a marginal increase in the size of the farm (where other fixed assets 
such as buildings or machinery can be made more profitable) this can lead to high bid 
prices for such assets. 'High' in relation to average profits in the sector, not necessarily in 
relation to return on investment of the investing farmer. 
 The high prices for assets with a fixed supply reflect a rent and contribute to the capi-
tal gains and wealth of farmers. Cashing in those capital gains the moment they retire, are 
especially farmers with a low performance and income, who cannot follow a strategy of 
increasing their farm size. Their farm is then too small for one of the children to take over 
as a full time enterprise. It also explains why farmers live poor and die rich, which also 
implies that farm sectors with a lot of assets that have a fixed supply, have a very strong 
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barrier to enter. Due to the high prices of the assets (when not bought as a marginal in-
crease of an existing holding) the return on investment is too low. 
 In interpreting statistics on agricultural income this means that differences in income 
can be (partly) explained as differences in competences (or management levels) and strate-
gies of farmers. They can also be interpreted as a snapshot of competing strategies in a 
kind of evolutionary process, where the fittest strategies have not yet survived and new 
strategies still emerge. 
 This is even more the case when external shocks, such as technical change or policy 
adjustment, take place. In such situations strategic management is more important and re-
quires for different skills, where some farmers have only been trained in the past in 
operational management. Strategy and marketing were less important in a centrally 
planned agricultural economy than in a market oriented, larger scale market economy with 
product differentiation. In times of external shocks more mistakes will be made in selecting 
and executing a good strategy by farmers. And some farmers develop strategies that now 
take low incomes for granted (by heavy borrowing, or converting their farm to another 
production process) to win market share and to cash in later. The accounting photo there-
fore does not necessarily provide a true and fair view of reality. With that in mind, larger 
differences in income (a more skewed income distribution) and relatively higher prices for 
assets with a fixed supply might be expected in times of adjustment. 
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9. Lacking research on reactions to farm policy adjustment 
 
 
 
As far as these authors are aware of, not much micro-economic research has been done to 
study the reaction of farmers to policy adjustments. The studies reported above deal with 
differences in farm performance, strategies and farm characteristics/farmer's competences. 
They suggest that policy adjustments have different effects on farms with different strate-
gies and farm styles and they suggest that some public policies (such as multi-functionality 
or organic farming) are easier taken up by some types of farms than by others (Eshuis and 
Buurma (1998) provide an example for organic farming). And they show that innovation is 
different between sectors such as glasshouse horticulture and dairy farming, which can 
partly be explained by the characteristics of the market and the agricultural policy that are 
different (Diederen et al., 2003b). However, they do not prove that a severe adjustment of 
agricultural policy e.g. towards a more market oriented policy induces more innovation, 
and that due to this innovation the effects of adjusting the agricultural policy are less se-
vere than ex-ante estimated with current dynamic policy models. In management the 
saying is that 'you need a man, a plan and a crisis for change'. Adjustment of farm policies 
is often perceived as a crisis, but it seems that good empirical studies fail to see if man re-
acts with a plan leading to profitable change. 
 From our point of view this is a key research issue to address. We therefore make a 
number of additional comments related to this question. First we comment on the devel-
opments in European agriculture in the 1990s, as reported in a study for the European 
Parliament (Vrolijk et al., 2004), when some sectors such as cereals were reformed, and 
others (such as dairy) were not: 
 
'The analysis of income trends in the nineties reveals some interesting observations 
on the role of the CAP reform on income development, even if an ex-post evaluation 
of those reforms is not the purpose of this report. First of all it is concluded that eco-
nomic processes like farm expansion (to reap the benefits of economies of scale), 
specialisation, reducing labour input, increasing capital, and restructuring the indus-
try concerning the number of farms (leading to concentration) goes on in all sectors, 
'reformed' by policy interventions in the early nineties, unreformed under the CAP or 
nearly untouched by the CAP (like horticulture). An exception is perhaps the (rever-
sal of) the trend of specialisation in dairy production (due to quota), but the other 
processes (like concentration and capital investment) confront the dairy farmers with 
at least as many strategic decisions and changes in their farm management as their 
colleagues in other sectors. In general this implies that regime changes in the CAP, 
like the MacSharry reforms, if well designed, do not seem to hurt the economic effi-
ciency of the sector. It also implies that keeping the policy stable, like in dairy, does 
not mean that there are no changes in the sector. Also in that case there are losers and 
winners in the economic competition. 
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Secondly, it seems that the introduction of direct payments have contributed to sus-
tain the incomes in the cereal sector (including proteins and oilseeds). The same 
seems to be the case in the beef sector. Especially in cereals the number of specialist 
farms has grown. This is remarkable, as at the time of introduction of the reform, 
there was much fear for a shake out of the sector. However the average incomes re-
main at a modest level in these sectors, compared to more attractive levels at farms in 
dairy, wine or horticulture.' 
 
 A second observation relates to the object of research. Nearly all the micro-economic 
research cited above deals with the farm business and the farmer, not with the agricultural 
household. In some regions, farm types and strategies, farmers combine farming activities 
with non-agricultural activities (and the boundary between the two is not so clear either). 
As individuals from a family pool their income or share their expenses in a household, a 
decrease in income from farming can also lead to more non-agricultural income by one of 
the other household members. It is therefore probably not the farmer or the farm that has a 
strategy to survive, but the household. 
 An interesting example of the policy relevance of such research was provided re-
cently by Hennesy (2004) who made an ex-ante policy evaluation on the current reform 
(mid term review proposals) of the CAP. Using micro-data and econometric models she 
showed how a lower marginal income per hour from farming (after decoupling) will lead 
to substitution of labour into more non-agricultural activities. 
 Besides using econometrics to model past behaviour it can be attractive to use simu-
lation tools (like the ISP tools described above) and experimental economics to test the 
reaction of farmers to policies. Hubeek et al. (2004) used this in ex-ante policy analysis on 
the Dutch nitrate policy. This type of 'gaming' is especially attractive in cases of important 
policy adjustments, and it can help policy makers to fine tune their policies. 
 Last but not least it seems attractive to explore further the role of human (and social) 
capital. It seems that farmers have not only different competences, but that there is a group 
of farmers with superior human capital, who are good in interpreting signals from markets 
and society, who are able to adjust their farm strategy and farm system in advance of oth-
ers and even agricultural policy adjustments. In projects with farmers we come across 
farmers that have an environmental (and economic) performance at a level that will be re-
quired only in a few years time. They are fit for the future. They are the type of farmers 
who buy extra roughage at a time when others are still wondering about the potential ef-
fects of a dry summer elsewhere in Europe. The category includes farmers who earned a 
lot of money in the 1990s with organic farming (first-mover advantage), where it is less 
profitable now. It would be interesting and useful to learn more about the characteristics 
and methods of such persons, and how policy makers can remove bottlenecks that exist for 
others to perform in the same way. 
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10. Policy relevance 
 
 
 
Even if we cannot prove that a severe adjustment of agricultural policy e.g. towards a more 
market oriented policy induces more innovation, and that due to this innovation the effects 
of adjusting the agricultural policy are less severe than estimated ex-ante with current dy-
namic policy models, what advise can we provide to policy makers? 
 First, policy makers should be careful with interpreting static statistics on the distri-
bution of income, especially if given for a certain year instead of a three-year average. 
Increasing differences in income can be a sign of innovation and adjustment, and are not 
bad for the wealth of the nation by definition. 
 Second, innovation, farm development and restructuring of industries occur in all 
sectors, being heavily regulated by the CAP, reformed under the CAP or nearly untouched 
by the CAP. If the objective of the CAP would be to keep farmers farming, it is not very 
successful. 
 Third, to be successful policies on innovation into new production methods should 
take into account that some types of farmers (depending on their competences and strate-
gies) are more willing to take part in a policy programme than others. Examples are 
policies to promote organic farming, to produce high quality food products or to produce 
public goods in multi-functionality programs. In such policies segmentation of policy cli-
ents makes sense. 
 Fourth, if innovation as such is the policy aim (like in the EU's Lisbon process) pol-
icy makers should first of all take away uncertainty that arises from policy risks. 
Government policies can be restrictive, but they should not be subject to unpredictable, 
frequent changes that make investments unprofitable. Financial support is less important. 
Ideally policies (e.g. on animal welfare) should be announced in such a way that they fit 
into the normal investment cycle of a farm. Unfortunately, this asks for long term man-
agement that short term looking, election dependent, administrations cannot always 
provide. 
 Fifth, as innovators make more use of R&D by third parties, extension and consul-
tancy, stimulating the availability and supply of such services can make sense. Education 
of farmers, also at later stages in life, to improve competences is potentially beneficial. 
Such activities can be a useful part of policy package that tries to cushion the effects of a 
farm adjustment policy. Recent ex-post analysis on such projects in the Dutch environ-
mental policy (Geerling-Eiff et al., 2004) learns however that such projects are not 
automatically successful and that careful project design is needed to secure success. 
 In the end policy makers, also in planning agricultural adjustment programs, have to 
decide how they allocate their resources over promoting innovation (including fostering 
R&D), diffusion (with extension etc.) and providing a security net (income and social pol-
icy) for those who are not able to adjust. All three objectives seem to be important but 
current research results do not give a general clue how to do such allocations. 
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11. Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
 
The replacement of the typewriter by the computer with text processing software led to 
winners and losers in secretarial jobs. This simple change in technology implied that skills 
such as typing error free, deciphering hand written texts and recognising spelling mistakes 
were (at least partly) replaced or compensated by the computer: spelling errors were de-
tected by software, typing errors could be corrected easily, researchers and managers 
started to type. Desktop publishing skills such as improving the lay-out, making graphs etc. 
became more valuable skills. The change in technology implied winners and losers: some 
secretaries learned new skills, and some of them performed better in these new ones than in 
their old ones. However, some were not able to adjust and sometimes lost their job. 
 Adjustments in agriculture, be it technology or policy driven, have similar effects. 
There are winners and losers. This is often calculated in the direct income effect of an ex-
ante evaluation of a policy proposal in relation to farm income (and sometimes wealth). If 
economists do their job well, they also calculate the income effect after markets reach a 
new equilibrium in prices and they compare it with a baseline scenario. 
 What is however most difficult in these calculations, is the time and costs needed by 
farmers (and their family members) to adjust to the new incentives from the market and the 
policy instruments. There is currently no reason to assume that such effects are underesti-
mated. However, two topics stand out for further research to improve our understanding of 
how farmers adjust to policy change: 
- some ex-post analysis of policy changes should be done on a micro-economic basis 
over a longer period to fully understand the effects of big shocks. The cereal sector in 
e.g. France or the UK in the 1990s and the plant potato sector in the Netherlands1 are 
potential candidates for this; 
- cross country analyses on the relation between innovation, farm strategies and sector 
characteristics. The Diederen et al. (2003b) study indicated that regulation has a 
negative impact on innovative behaviour. However, the evidence was partial because 
sector characteristics\technological opportunities also differ between regulated and 
non-regulated sectors. To separate these effects a multi-country survey would be 
beneficial: A sample should include sectors which are protected in some countries 
                                                 
1 The Dutch plant potato industry installed a private intervention scheme in the 1950s with legal backing 
from the Dutch government and later the EU. The aim was to support product differentiation for risky foreign 
(non-EU) markets by buying up produce that could not be exported below a certain minimum price. The in-
dustry, which became less fragmented under a few large cooperatives/exporters, abandoned this in the 1990s 
when product differentiation had probably gone too far and a risk of free-rider behaviour due to high inter-
vention prices in relation to increased yields, was suggested. The impression is that after liberalisation the 
exporters had an incentive not to start a price war and destroy markets; that prices did not drop as much as 
ex-ante analysis suggested; and that competition between farmers increased. It is however not clear if this is 
all due to the liberalisation and neither has any ex-post analysis been done on the strategies of agricultural 
households and the shocks they experienced. 
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and not protected in others. For example, the dairy sector in Netherlands versus the 
dairy sector in New Zealand; 
- research should shift from the agricultural production side to adaptations in the agri-
cultural household to fully understand decision making of farm families. This 
probably would imply that besides a pure agricultural economics approach, some co-
operation with economic-sociologists would be beneficial; 
- adjustment should take chain issues into account. Adjustment is also dependent on 
the competitiveness of other industries in the chain. For example, an innovative dairy 
processing industry can reduce adjustments in the primary sector. 
 33
 34
References 
 
 
 
Alleblas, J.T.W., Management in de glastuinbouw. The Hague, 1988. 
 
Alleblas, J.T.W., A. Boers, C.J.A.M. de Bont and J.H. Jager, Achtergronden van inko-
mensverschillen in drie agrarische sectoren. The Hague, 1998. 
 
Barney, J., Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of Manage-
ment, Vol. 17, 1991, pp. 99-120. 
 
Bauwens, A.L.G.M., M.N. de Groot and K.J. Poppe (eds), Agrarisch Bestaan. Assen, 
1990. 
 
Breembroek, J.A., B. Koole, K.J. Poppe and G.A.A. Wossink, 'Environmental Farm Ac-
counting: the case of the Dutch nutrients accounting system', In: Agricultural Systems 51 
(1996), p. 29-40. 
 
Brouwer, E. and A. Kleinknecht, 'Determinants of innovation. A micro-econometric analy-
sis of three alternative innovation output indicators', In: A. Kleinknecht (ed.), Determinants 
of Innovation, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 99-124. 
 
Cohen, W.M. and R.C. Levin, 'Empirical studies of innovation and market structure', 
In: R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig, (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amster-
dam: North Holland, 1989. 
 
Conner, K., A Historical Comparison of Resource Based Theory and Five Schools of 
Thought within Industrial Organisation Economics: Do we have a Theory of the Firm?, 
Journal of Management, Vol. 17, 1991, pp. 121-154. 
 
Diederen, P., H. van Meijl and A. Wolters, 'Innovation and farm performance: The case of 
Dutch Agriculture', In: A. Kleinknecht and P. Mohnen, Innovation and firm performance: 
Econometric explorations of survey data, Palgrave, 2002. 
 
Diederen, P., H. van Meijl, A. Wolters and K. Bijak, Innovation adoption in Agriculture: 
Innovators, Early Adoptors and Laggards, Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, no. 
67, 2003, pp. 30-50, 2003a. 
 
Diederen, P., H. van Meijl and A. Wolters, Modernisation in agriculture: what makes a 
farmer adopt an innovation, International Journal of Resources, Governance and Ecology, 
Vol. 2, No.3/4, pp. 328-342, 2003b. 
 35
Eshuis, J. and J. Buurma, Biologische landbouw in de Wieringermeer, 1998. 
 
Galen, M.A. van and F.H.J. Bunte, Innovatie en prestatie, The Hague, 2002. 
 
Ham, A. van den and M. Ypma, Verbreding op landbouwbedrijven, The Hague, 2000. 
 
Ham, A. van den, C.H.G. Daatselaar, A.M. Prins and D.W. de Hoop, Naar kostprijsbe-
heersing in de melkveehouderij, The Hague, 2003. 
 
Hennesy, T., An analysis of the impact of decoupling in Ireland, paper for an OECD work-
shop on information needs for the analysis of farm household income issues, Paris, 2004. 
 
Hoop, D.W. de, J. Engelsma and G.J. Wisselink, De taktische boer, The Hague, 1988. 
 
Hubeek, F.B. and D.W. de Hoop, Terugblik op Minas, Dierrechten en MAO en verkenning 
van MAO of Dierrechten en van Gebruiksnormenstelsel, The Hague, 2004. 
 
Geerling-Eiff, F.A, F.B. Hubeek and P.J. van Baalen, Kennis en gedrag, The Hague, 2004. 
 
Peerlings, J. and A. Oude Lansink, 'Profit function and household production models - ap-
plications on Dutch agriculture', In: C.J.A.M. de Bont, J. Peerlings and A. Oude Lansink, 
Het Bedrijven-Informatienet - 10 jaar van onderzoek, The Hague, 2000. 
 
Ploeg, J.D. van der, J. Roex and B. Koole, Bedrijfsstijlen en kengetallen - zicht op infor-
matie, The Hague 1996. 
 
Porter, M., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for analysis of industries and competitors, 
The Free Press, New York, 1980. 
 
Porter, M., Competitive Strategy, The Free Press, New York, 1985. 
 
Reinhard, S., Econometric analysis of economic and environmental efficiency of Dutch 
dairy farmers, Wageningen, 1999a. 
 
Reinhard, S., C.A.K. Lovell and G. Thijssen, Econometric Estimation of Technical and 
Environmental Efficiency - an application to Dutch Dairy Farms. American Journal of Ag-
ricultural Economics 81:1 (February), 1999b. 
 
Rumelt, R.P., How Much Does Industry Matter?, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, 
1991, pp. 167-85. 
 
Tomer, J.E., Organisational Capital: The Path to higher Productivity and Well-being. New 
York, Praeger, 1987. 
 36
Taragola, N., G. van Huylenbroeck and D. van Lierde, 'Adoption of environmental sound 
and high quality production strategies and financial performance of Belgian glasshouse 
holdings', In: G. Beers, K.J. Poppe and A. Leuftink, Pacioli 8 - Innovations in the FADN, 
The Hague, 2001. 
 
Taragola, N., D. van Lierde and G. van Huylenbroeck: 'Accounting data as an aid for deci-
sion making of Belgian glasshouse managers', In: G. Beers, K.J. Poppe and C. Teeuwen-
Vogelaar, Pacioli 9 - Innovations in the FADN, The Hague, 2002. 
 
Vrolijk, H.C.J., K.J. Poppe, C.J.A.M. de Bont, B. Koole, J.H. Jager and A. Wisman, Evolu-
tion of farm incomes in the European Parliament, Brussels, 2004. 
 
Zachariasse, L.C., Boer en bedrijfsresultaat, Wageningen, 1974. 
 37
